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COORDINATION, FOCAL POINTS AND VOTING IN  
STRATEGIC SITUATIONS: A NATURAL EXPERIMENT 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Several experimental studies have shown that when faced with complex coordination 
problems presented in an abstract form, people often need to play the same game repeatedly 
in order to learn to coordinate with each other in the absence of communication (see e.g. 
Blume and Gneezy 2000). However, in the real world situations when strategies could be 
identified by labeling, people tend to choose solutions that appear to be salient, peculiar, 
noticeable, relevant or natural to them. These solutions have been first elucidated in the 
classic work of Thomas Schelling (1960) as “focal point[s] for each person’s expectation of 
what the other expects him to be expected to do” (Schelling 1960: 57).1 Experimental 
research has provided evidence that salience may become an effective coordination 
mechanism in strategic games with multiple equilibria (see e.g. Mehta et al. 1994 a, b). 
We investigate coordination in a strategic situation with voting in the presence of a 
focal principle using data from a natural experiment of British Broadcasting Corporation 
(BBC) television show, The Weakest Link, with large monetary incentives and a diversified 
subject pool drawn from the adult British population.2 This paper is related to two streams of 
literature: literature on voting in strategic situations and literature on decision making in game 
shows. 
Much of the research in economics and psychology has concentrated on voting in 
strategic situations. At the theoretical level, several studies have analyzed coordination 
problems in elections with different information aggregation mechanisms. Particularly, 
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) assess coordination in elections with fixed alternatives and 
show that the electoral rule is the main determinant of the equilibrium voting behavior. The 
impact of signaling on voting in strategic situations is explored in Lohman (1993) and Razin 
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(2003). Piketty (2000) analyzes the coordination of voters in a repeated election with multiple 
candidates. Experimental studies on voting in strategic situations date back to Fiorina and 
Plott (1978) and focus on coordination, resource allocation and voting cycles (e.g. Eckel and 
Holt 1989; Holt and Anderson 1999). Even though the literature on voting in strategic 
situations offers many insights into the nature and mechanisms of the electoral process, to 
date, economic research has provided little guidance with regard to voting in strategic 
situations in the presence of a focal principle. 
Television shows have long represented an appealing material for economic 
researchers. Particularly, Metrick (1995) argues that the television show is a suitable 
empirical resource for economists, since many of these shows are structured as well-defined 
decision problems or strategic games. Bennett and Hickman (1993) and Berk et al. (1996) use 
data from the television show The Price is Right to test for the optimal information updating 
and rational bidding strategies correspondingly. Gertner (1993), Metrick (1995), and Beetsma 
and Schotman (2001) use data from Card Sharks, Jeopardy! and Lingo respectively to 
measure individual risk attitudes. The Weakest Link television show has also attracted the 
attention of several researchers.3 
The Weakest Link is designed as an elimination tournament so that only one of nine 
contestants who participate in the game earns the monetary prize, which is accumulated by 
the team (the remaining contestants receive nothing). Members of the team have never met 
each other before the show. Contestants are eliminated from the tournament by plurality 
voting. Every contestant can vote against only one of her counterparts. Therefore, the action 
space is well-defined and common knowledge. The monetary prize is generated from correct 
answers to general knowledge questions. Contestants are heterogeneous in their ability to 
answer general knowledge questions. These abilities, as well as voting decisions of 
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contestants, are observable in all rounds of the game. In every round the host of the show 
encourages the team to eliminate the weakest player. 
Our first objective is to explore whether contestants coordinate successfully when 
making their voting decisions. Our second objective is to understand whether observed 
coordination (if any) could be attributed to learning or to the existence of the focal principle to 
eliminate the weakest contestant. Finally, we use econometric estimation to identify factors 
that influence individual voting decisions in the show. 
We find that contestants behave differently at the beginning and at the end of the 
show. Starting from the first round of the game contestants succeed in coordinating on one of 
the multiple Nash equilibria in pure strategies. They eliminate the weakest opponent with an 
overwhelming plurality, which appears to be a focal principle (Schelling 1960). However, 
coordination rates decline as the game progresses. In the later rounds of The Weakest Link, 
contestants appear to play strictly mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. We also show that the 
main determinants of individual voting decisions in The Weakest Link are the relative rank of 
an opponent (in terms of ability to answer general knowledge questions), negative reciprocity 
(contestants tend to vote against these counterparts, who voted against them in previous 
rounds) and money lost by the opponent (due to incorrect answers). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the television 
show The Weakest Link and offers basic statistics of the data set. Section 3 provides game 
theoretical analysis of the show and explores coordination and its dynamics during the game. 
Section 4 presents an econometric analysis of the determinants of individual voting decisions. 
Section 5 concludes with a general discussion. 
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2. DESCRIPTION OF THE TELEVISION SHOW 
2.1. RULES OF THE GAME 
In the British version of The Weakest Link, nine contestants participate in every episode. 
Becoming a contestant requires applying by phone or e-mail to the BBC. Therefore, all 
contestants self-select into the television show and have some familiarity with the rules of the 
game when they apply for participation. Contestants come from different educational and 
professional backgrounds. They do not know the intellectual capabilities of each other before 
the game starts. There is, however, a preliminary two-hour session before the show when 
contestants are introduced to each other. The session is monitored and the possibility of 
conspiracy among contestants is excluded. 
Every episode of the television show The Weakest Link consists of seven rounds and a 
final round. Figure 1 presents the chronological sequence of events. 
[INSERT Figure 1 HERE] 
In round ݅ א ሼ1, … ,7ሽ there are 10 െ ݅ contestants who sequentially answer general 
knowledge questions at time ݐ ൌ 2݅ െ 1. Table 1 presents the technology that converts correct 
answers to general knowledge questions into money. Every contestant can use this technology 
by saying “Bank!” when it is her turn to answer a question but before this question is actually 
asked. In this case, the sequence of correct answers given in a row is broken and the 
contestants have to build a new chain of correct answers from zero. If a contestant does not 
use the technology and answers a question incorrectly, all money accumulated in the chain is 
lost and the team has to start a new chain. 
[INSERT Table 1 HERE] 
In round ݅ א ሼ1, … ,7ሽ there is a limit of 190 െ 10݅ seconds for answering general 
knowledge questions. The amount of money that can be earned in one round is limited to 
£1000. General knowledge questions increase in difficulty from round to round. 
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In round ݅ א ሼ1, … ,7ሽ the remaining 10 െ ݅ members of the team eliminate one 
contestant at time ݐ ൌ 2݅ (Figure 1). Contestants cast votes simultaneously and independently 
from each other. Specifically, every contestant writes the name of her candidate for 
elimination on a plastic board, which is not visible to the others. When voting is over, 
contestants reveal their voting decisions. The contestant who received more votes than any 
other contestant is eliminated from the game as the weakest link. In other words, contestants 
are eliminated by plurality voting. 
The game is very intense as contestants not only have to answer questions and keep 
track of money accumulated in the chain, but they also must pay attention to the performance 
of each other to make their voting decisions at the end of each of the seven rounds, until the 
number of contestants boils down to two. The tension is increased by the sarcastic remarks of 
the host, Anne Robinson, who has a reputation of “the rudest person on British television”.4 
Two contestants compete in the final round. At time ݐ ൌ 15 they accumulate 
additional money by answering general knowledge questions. The technology, presented in 
Table 1, is available to the finalists, however, any money banked is tripled and the time limit 
is 90 seconds. At ݐ ൌ 16, the winner is determined through the head-to-head general 
knowledge quiz of five questions per contestant.5 The winner receives the total prize earned in 
the show. The other eight contestants leave with nothing. 
2.2. BASIC STATISTICS 
The data have been transcribed from BBC Prime The Weakest Link original broadcasts, aired 
between January 7, 2005 and October 21, 2005. Excluding repetitions, the sample contains a 
total of 100 television episodes. The resulting laboratory incorporates 4200 voting decisions 
made by 900 contestants. Table 2 presents selected descriptive statistics of the sample, 
revealing some characteristics of the contestants.  
[INSERT Table 2 HERE] 
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Contestants are recruited from all administrative regions of the United Kingdom. The 
majority of contestants are white adults, from 18 to 84 years old (with the average age of 46 
years). 58.89% of contestants are male and 41.11 % female. Even though contestants usually 
reveal their occupation at the beginning of the show and answer questions about their 
profession posed by the host during the game, it is difficult to deduce hard data from these 
self-reported characteristics. 
One of the main advantages of The Weakest Link natural laboratory is that the stakes 
in the show are higher than in any standard laboratory experiment. Notably, prizes in the 
recorded sample ranged from £830.00 to £5,420.00 with an average of £2,330.60, median of 
£2,275.00 and standard deviation of £846.70 across 100 episodes. 
3. GAME THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
In this section we provide a game theoretical analysis of the show. Our analysis can be 
divided into three main parts. First, we construct the relative ranking of contestants in terms 
of ability to answer general knowledge questions during the show. This ranking allows us to 
incorporate heterogeneity of contestants in our theoretical analysis. Second, we consider Nash 
equilibria in pure strategies in the early rounds of the show and determine whether contestants 
coordinate on any of the available equilibria. Third, we calculate Nash equilibria in pure and 
mixed strategies in the later rounds of the show. We also explore whether behavior of 
contestants can be rationalized within our theoretical predictions. 
3.1. RANKING OF CONTESTANTS 
In The Weakest Link television show contestants are heterogeneous in their ability to answer 
general knowledge questions. In order to account for this heterogeneity we construct a 
measure of the relative ranking of contestants in each round of the game. This ranking is used 
in our game theoretical and econometric analysis below. The performance of every contestant 
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݆ א ሼ1, … ,10 െ ݅ሽ participating in the plurality voting in round ݅ א ሼ1, … ,7ሽ is measured by 
index  
(1)     ܥ௝
௥ ൌ
∑ ఠೝ௔ೕ
ೝ೔
ೝసభ
∑ ఠೝ௕ೕ
ೝ೔
ೝసభ
, 
where ௝ܽ௥ is a number of correct answers given by contestant ݆ in round ݎ א ሼ1, … , ݅ሽ and ௝ܾ௥ is 
the total number of questions that contestant ݆ was asked in round ݎ. 
During the show, the host warns contestants that the questions become more complex 
as the game progresses. In order to account for this feature of the game show design, we 
compute weights ߱௥ that capture the relative difficulty of questions across rounds, from the 
game show data. Weights ߱௥ are calculated as a fraction of incorrect answers given in round ݎ 
by 300 contestants who participated in all seven rounds in our recorded sample of 100 
television episodes, relative to the total number of questions that these contestants have 
received in round ݎ. Table 3 demonstrates that obtained weights ߱௥ increase in ݎ. In other 
words, our analysis confirms the claim of the game show host that questions become more 
difficult in the later rounds of the game. We incorporate weights ߱௥ in our index of 
contestants’ performance (1) in order to account for the increased difficulty of questions 
towards the end of the show.  
[INSERT Table 3 HERE] 
The rank of contestant ݆ in round ݅ is denoted by ܺ1௝௜ א ሼ1, … ,10 െ ݅ሽ. It is assigned in 
descending order based on index (1), i.e. the contestant with the highest index ܥ௝௥ (ݎ א
ሼ1, … , ݅ሽ) receives the highest rank (rank 1). If several contestants have the same index ܥ௝௥, 
which is frequently observed in early rounds of the game (ݎ ൑ 4), they are assigned an 
average shared rank. 
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3.2. PURE STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA IN THE EARLY ROUNDS 
Proposition 1 In round ݅ א ሼ1, … ,5ሽ any voting profile, where ݆ א ሼ4, … ,9 െ ݅ሽ contestants 
vote against the same person and no more than ݆ െ 3 remaining contestants vote against 
another person, constitutes a pure strategy Nash equilibrium independent of the prize in the 
game and relative probabilities of winning for different contestants. 
Proof Even if one contestant changes her vote, at least ݆ െ 1 contestants will vote 
against the same person, and no more than ݆ െ 2 remaining contestants will vote against 
another person. Therefore, the outcome of plurality voting remains unchanged and none of the 
contestants has an incentive to change her vote. Q.E.D. 
Intuitively, when an overwhelming plurality of contestants vote against the same 
person, such voting profile constitutes an equilibrium because no one can change the outcome 
(of plurality voting) by switching her vote. An overwhelming plurality is formed when one of 
the candidates for elimination has a three-vote lead. By definition, an overwhelming plurality 
cannot be formed in rounds 6 and 7. For example, consider round 6 with 4 contestants. When 
three contestants vote against the fourth contestant, one of them may have an incentive to 
deviate and cast her vote against the same contestant, who has been eliminated by the fourth 
contestant. The plurality vote then becomes tied and the expected payoff for the contestant 
who deviated can be higher than her payoff from eliminating the fourth contestant with 
certainty. Therefore, equilibria identified in proposition 1 cannot be observed in rounds 6 and 
7. 
3.3. COORDINATION AND FOCAL PRINCIPLE IN THE EARLY ROUNDS 
Obviously, there are many possible ways to form an overwhelming plurality in every round 
݅ א ሼ1, … ,5ሽ. However, since the title of the television show is The Weakest Link, the focal 
principle is to vote against the weakest opponent (Schelling 1960). Moreover, the host 
repeatedly encourages contestants “to have the courage to eliminate the weakest link.” Thus, 
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the voting profiles when an overwhelming plurality votes against the weakest opponent strike 
out as the focal equilibria on which contestants can easily coordinate. 
[INSERT Table 4 HERE] 
Table 4 shows the number of television episodes when an overwhelming plurality of 
contestants vote against the same person and the distribution of such episodes according to the 
rank of the contestant who is eliminated. In other words, Table 4 presents cases, when an 
observed voting profile in round ݅ א ሼ1, … ,5ሽ satisfies the conditions of proposition 1. 
Apparently, when an overwhelming plurality of contestants vote against one person, they vote 
against the opponent with the lowest rank.6 For example, in round 1 contestants have formed 
an overwhelming plurality in 73 television episodes. In 66 of these episodes (90%) they have 
voted against the weakest contestant (ranked 9). Thus, among all possible equilibria identified 
in proposition 1, contestants manage to play the focal equilibria when they coordinate on 
voting against the weakest opponent, even without explicit pre-play communication or 
learning in early rounds.  
Table 4 shows that pure strategy equilibria identified in proposition 1 are played less 
often as the game progresses.7 For example, in round 5 contestants manage to form an over-
whelming plurality only in 19 television episodes. In 12 of these episodes (63%) contestants 
coordinate on voting against the lowest ranked contestant. Thus, not only do the instances of 
successful coordination tend to decline but also the relative frequency of coordination on 
focal equilibria decreases, as the game progresses. 
Apparently, from the first round, contestants succeed in playing pure strategy 
equilibria identified in proposition 1 (particularly, focal equilibria). However, contestants do 
not remain in these equilibria. In the later rounds of the game, the majority of observed voting 
profiles do not satisfy the conditions of proposition 1. This suggests that as the game 
progresses, contestants start to think more strategically when casting their votes and eliminate 
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strong opponents to secure a win in the final. To investigate this possibility we conduct a 
game theoretical analysis of the later rounds of the game. 
3.4. EQUILIBRIA IN THE LAST ROUND 
To understand voting behavior in the later rounds of the game, we analyze the last round 
(round 7).8 In round 7 there are three contestants left in the game. For simplicity, we will refer 
to a contestant who is ranked ݆ א ሼ1,2,3ሽ in round 7 as contestant ݆. The left panel of Figure 2, 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 shows the cumulative distribution function of a monetary payoff (in 
British pounds) that, respectively, contestant 1, contestant 2 and contestant 3 received in 100 
television episodes of our recorded sample. The right panel of Figure 2, Figure 3 and Figure 4 
shows the certainty equivalent of a corresponding stochastic payoff (ݔ ൒ 0) on the left panel. 
The certainty equivalents are calculated using CRRA utility function ݑሺݔሻ ൌ ݔଵି௥ ሺ1 െ ݎሻ⁄  
for a plausible range of the coefficients of relative risk aversion ݎ א ሾെ2, 1ሻ. 
Let ߨ௝௞ be the expected utility of a payoff for contestant ݆ א ሼ1,2,3ሽ if contestant 
݇ א ሼ1,2,3ሽ, ݇ ് ݆, is eliminated in round 7. Notice that the right panels of Figure 2, Figure 3 
and Figure 4 show monetary outcomes with utilities ߨଵଶ and ߨଵଷ given CRRA utility function 
and various coefficients of relative risk aversion ݎ א ሾെ2, 1ሻ. Similarly, the right panel of 
Figure 2, Figure 3 and Figure 4 shows monetary outcomes with utilities ߨଶଵ and ߨଶଷ (ߨଷଵ and 
ߨଷଶ). 
[INSERT Figure 2, Figure 3 and Figure 4 HERE] 
A quick inspection of the right panels of Figure 2, Figure 3 and Figure 4 reveals that 
actual payoffs in round 7 satisfy condition (2) for plausible risk attitudes of contestants.9 
 (2)   ߨଵଷ ൑ ߨଵଶ ൏ 2ߨଵଷ, ߨଶଷ ൏ ߨଶଵ ൑ 2ߨଶଷ, ߨଷଶ ൏ ߨଷଵ ൏ 2ߨଷଶ 
In round 7 (at ݐ ൌ 14) contestants play the game that is presented in the normal form 
on Figure 5. Notation ௝ܵ௞ denotes an action of contestant ݆ א ሼ1,2,3ሽ when she votes against 
contestant ݇ א ሼ1,2,3ሽ, ݇ ് ݆. In case of a tie, e.g. when contestant 1 votes against contestant 
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2, contestant 2 votes against contestant 3 and contestant 3 votes against contestant 1, we 
assume that every contestant has equal chance of being eliminated (with probability 1/3).10 
The payoffs are presented in vector form on Figure 5 with a convention that the first number 
is the payoff of contestant 1 and the last number is the payoff of contestant 3. 
[INSERT Figure 5 HERE] 
Proposition 2 The game presented in the normal form on Figure 5 with parameters 
that satisfy condition (2) has only four Nash equilibria that are presented in Table 5. 
[INSERT Table 5 HERE] 
Proof The situation when two contestants vote against each other and the remaining 
contestant randomizes cannot be an equilibrium because the remaining contestant is better off 
by voting with probability 1 against the contestant whom she would like to eliminate. The 
situation when two contestants vote against different people and the remaining contestant 
randomizes also cannot constitute an equilibrium. The latter contestant is better off by voting 
with probability 1 against the contestant who votes against her. The situation when two 
contestants vote against the third contestant and the latter randomizes is a Nash equilibrium, 
provided that the third contestant randomizes in such a way that neither of the first two 
contestants has an incentive to change her vote. This yields equilibria 1-3 in Table 5. 
The situation when one contestant votes against one of her opponents with probability 
1 and two remaining contestants randomize cannot be an equilibrium. The contestant, against 
whom the first player casts her vote, is better off by voting with probability 1 against the first 
player. Thus, the only remaining possibility is that all three contestants play strictly mixed 
strategies and this leads to equilibrium 4 in Table 5. Q. E. D. 
Four equilibria presented in Table 5 cannot be ranked according to the payoff 
dominance (e.g. Harsanyi and Selten 1988). In equilibria 1, 2 and 3, correspondingly, 
contestant 1, 2 and 3 is eliminated with certainty and receives zero payoff. In equilibrium 4, 
all contestants receive positive expected payoff but at least one contestant can receive a 
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strictly better payoff in equilibria 1-3 (contestants 2 and 3 receive the best possible payoff in 
equilibrium 1 and contestant 1 – in equilibrium 2).11 
3.5. VOTING PROFILES IN THE LAST ROUND 
Assuming that contestants play one of the four Nash equilibria identified in Table 5 in all 
episodes, in this section we identify an equilibrium they are most likely to play given voting 
profiles observed in our recorded sample. Theoretically, it is possible to observe eight voting 
profiles in round 7, all being listed in the first column of Table 6. The second column of Table 
6 shows the percentage of episodes with a corresponding observed voting profile in round 7.  
[INSERT Table 6 HERE] 
According to Table 6, in 92% of all episodes two contestants vote against the same 
opponent. In particular, they vote against the strongest contestant in 23% of all episodes, 
against the second ranked contestant—in 32% of all games, and against the weakest 
contestant—in 37% of all episodes. Even though the weakest contestant is eliminated with the 
highest probability, frequencies of being eliminated are similar across all three contestants. 
The results of a set of Fisher’s exact tests (Fisher 1922) suggest that the differences between 
propensities of being eliminated between contestant 1 and 2 (݌ ൌ 0.20) and contestant 2 and 
contestant 3 (݌ ൌ 0.55) are not statistically significant. However, contestant 3 has a 
statistically significantly higher chance of being eliminated compared with contestant 1 
(݌ ൌ 0.04).12 These results indicate that even though contestants fail to coordinate on voting 
off the weakest counterpart in round 7 in the majority of episodes in our sample, relatively 
weaker contestants (contestant 2 and contestant 3) are more likely to be eliminated than the 
strongest contestant (contestant 1). 
Several voting profiles (e.g. “232” and “332”) are observed often (on average, in every 
fifth game), whereas other voting profiles (e.g. “231” and “312”) are observed rarely (on 
average, in every 25th game). The likelihood of observing different voting profiles depends on 
  
 
14
a particular equilibrium from Table 5 that contestants choose to play in round 7. Therefore, 
we can infer which equilibria contestants are most likely to play in round 7 from the observed 
frequencies of occurrence of various voting profiles. 
The third column of Table 6 shows that if contestants play equilibrium 1 from Table 5, 
they coordinate on this equilibrium in no more than 23% of all episodes. Similarly, if 
contestants play equilibria 2 and 3 from Table 5, they coordinate on these equilibria in no 
more than 32% and 37% of all episodes correspondingly (e.g. the fourth and the fifth column 
of Table 6). Therefore, it appears that in the majority of episodes in our sample contestants do 
not play one of equilibria 1-3. 
In equilibrium 4 from Table 5 all three contestants play strictly mixed strategies and 
therefore, every theoretically possible voting profile can be observed in this equilibrium. The 
predicted frequency of every voting profile in equilibrium 4 is presented in the last column of 
Table 6. It turns out that when contestants play equilibrium 4, they coordinate on this 
equilibrium in up to 60% of all episodes.13 In particular, as many as 60% of observed voting 
profiles can result from equilibrium 4 play when the strongest contestant plays ଵܵଶ with 
probability ݍ෤ ൌ 0.49, contestant 2 plays ܵଶଷ with probability ݌෤ ൌ 0.85 and the weakest 
contestant plays ܵଷଵ with probability ̃ݎ ൌ 0.16. 
Is it possible to justify such (or similar) mixed strategies by actual payoffs that 
contestants with plausible risk attitudes face in the show? To answer this question, we 
estimate the coefficients of relative risk aversion ݎ௜ א ሾെ2,1ሻ for every contestant ݆ א ሼ1,2,3ሽ 
such that: 
a) payoffs ߨ௝௞ are calculated as the expected utility from stochastic payoffs presented 
on the left panel of Figure 2, Figure 3, and Figure 4 using CRRA utility function;  
b) optimal strategies of contestants in equilibrium 4 are calculated using formulas in 
the last row of Table 5; 
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c) the predicted frequency of every voting profile that is theoretically possible in 
round 7 is calculated using formulas in the last column of Table 6; 
d) the number of episodes consistent with equilibrium 4 play is calculated as the 
highest number ݊ א ሼ1, … ,100ሽ such that every voting profile listed in Table 6 is 
observed with frequency at least as high as its predicted frequency multiplied by 
݊ 100⁄ ; 
e) the number of episodes consistent with equilibrium 4 play is maximized. 
The estimated coefficients of relative risk aversions are ݎଵ ൌ 0.57, ݎଶ ൌ െ1.90 and 
ݎଷ ൌ 0.68, correspondingly for contestant 1, 2 and 3. Given these risk attitudes and stochastic 
payoffs presented on the left panel of Figure 2, Figure 3, and Figure 4, the strongest 
contestant plays ଵܵଶ with probability ݍ෤ ൌ 0.49, contestant 2 plays ܵଶଷ with probability ݌෤ ൌ
0.89 and the weakest contestant plays ܵଷଵ with probability ̃ݎ ൌ 0.05. Observed voting profiles 
in 51% of all episodes are then consistent with assumption that contestants play equilibrium 4 
in round 7. 
To summarize, observed voting profiles of contestants suggest that if contestants play 
one of the four Nash equilibria identified in Table 5 in all episodes, they are most likely to 
play equilibrium 4 in round 7. In particular, equilibrium 4 is apparently played in every 
second episode if we assume that the strongest and the weakest contestants are slightly risk 
averse (with coefficients of relative risk aversion ݎଵ ൌ 0.57 and ݎଷ ൌ 0.68 respectively) and 
the second ranked contestant is highly risk seeking (with a coefficient of relative risk aversion 
ݎଶ ൌ െ1.90). However, there appears to be no obvious explanation why the second ranked 
contestant has such a different risk attitude from the other two contestants. 
The left panel of Figure 3 shows that the second ranked contestant has a strong 
incentive to vote against the strongest opponent — contestant 2 faces only 23% chance of 
earning the final prize if the weakest opponent is eliminated. However, the second column of 
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Table 6 shows that contestant 2 votes against contestant 1 (the strongest opponent) only in 
38% of all episodes. To explain such behavior within expected utility theory, we need to 
assume that contestant 2 is risk seeking. However, in more general non-expected utility 
theories, such as cumulative prospect theory (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman 1992) or rank-
dependent expected utility theory (e.g. Quiggin 1982), behavior of contestant 2 can be 
explained not only by risk seeking behavior but also by overweighting of small probabilities 
of large outcomes. 
There is a robust finding in economics and psychology that people distort 
probabilities: they tend to overweigh small probabilities and underweigh large probabilities 
(e.g. Kahneman and Taversky 1979; Gonzales and Wu 1999). To investigate the latter 
possibility, we assume that all three contestants evaluate stochastic payoffs ݔ௝௫ presented on 
the left panel of Figure 2, Figure 3, and Figure 4 according to formula                        
ߨ௝
௞ ൌ ∑ ݒሺݔሻ · ൣݓ൫݌ݎ݋ܾ൛ݔ௝
௫ ൒ ݔൟ൯ െ ݓ൫݌ݎ݋ܾ൛ݔ௝
௫ ൐ ݔൟ൯൧௫  of cumulative prospect theory (e.g. 
Tversky and Kahneman 1992) with value function ݒሺݔሻ ൌ ݔఈ and so-called Quiggin’s 
probability weighting function ݓሺ݌ሻ ൌ ݌ఊ ሺ݌ఊ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻఊሻ
భ
ം⁄ . Coefficients ߙ ൐ 0 and ߛ ൐ 0 
are estimated according to steps b)-e) explained above. These coefficients are constant for all 
three contestants. Note that expected utility theory (with power utility function) is a special 
case of cumulative prospect theory when coefficient ߛ equals one. 
Obtained estimates of the parameters of cumulative prospect theory are ߙ ൌ 0.52 and 
ߛ ൌ 0.88. These estimates are similar to the parameterizations of cumulative prospect theory 
that are typically found in numerous experimental studies (e.g. Blavatskyy 2005). With these 
estimated parameters, contestant 1 plays ଵܵଶ with probability ݍ෤ ൌ 0.49, contestant 2 plays ܵଶଷ 
with probability ݌෤ ൌ 0.86 and the weakest contestant plays ܵଷଵ with probability ̃ݎ ൌ 0.11. 
Given such mixed strategies, 56% of observed voting profiles are consistent with equilibrium 
4 play. 
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To summarize, among four Nash equilibria presented in Table 5, only a strictly mixed 
equilibrium 4 can explain more than one half of voting profiles observed in round 7. 
Moreover, contestants can play a strictly mixed equilibrium without having large differences 
in risk attitudes if they evaluate stochastic payoffs according to cumulative prospect theory 
rather than expected utility theory. Estimated parameterization of cumulative prospect theory 
for The Weakest Link contestants is in line with those found in other experimental studies.14 
4. DETERMINANTS OF INDIVIDUAL VOTING DECISIONS 
So far we have explored coordination dynamics during The Weakest Link television show. We 
have also provided several game theoretical explanations to the behavior of contestants. In 
this section we determine factors that influence individual voting decisions of contestants 
using an econometric estimation. 
In round ݅ א ሼ1, … ,7ሽ each of 10 െ ݅ contestants has to vote against one of 9 െ ݅ 
opponents. In order to identify the determinants of individual voting decisions in The Weakest 
Link television show, it is necessary to take into account two streams of explanatory variables. 
First, one needs to control for the personal characteristics of 10 െ ݅ contestants making voting 
decisions. Second, it is also important to consider the attributes of the voting alternatives, 
represented in The Weakest Link by the characteristics of 9 െ ݅ opponents, who may be 
eliminated. Therefore, a conditional logit model (Green 2003: 723) is particularly appropriate 
to investigate factors that influence individual voting decisions.15 
Let ௝ܻ௜ א ሼ1, … ,9 െ ݅ሽ be a discrete variable that denotes the voting decision of 
contestant ݆ א ሼ1, … ,10 െ ݅ሽ in round ݅ א ሼ1, … ,7ሽ. We estimate model (3), where ܺ1, … , ܺ7 
are explanatory variables described below. 
(3)   ݌ݎ݋ܾ൫ ௝ܻ
௜ ൌ ݉൯ ൌ
௘௫௣ቄఉభ௑ଵ೘೔ ାఉమ௑ଶೕ೘
೔ ାڮାఉళ௑଻ೕ೘
೔ ቅ
∑ ௘௫௣ቄఉభ௑ଵೖ
೔ ାఉమ௑ଶೕೖ
೔ ାڮାఉళ௑଻ೕೖ
೔ ቅవష೔ೖసభ
 
݉ א ሼ1, … ,9 െ ݅ሽ, ݆ א ሼ1, … ,10 െ ݅ሽ,  ݅ א ሼ1, … ,7ሽ, ݇ א ሼ1, … ,9 െ ݅ሽ 
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The Weakest Link is an elimination tournament, where contestants are heterogeneous 
in their ability to answer general knowledge questions. Therefore, a natural candidate for an 
explanatory variable is a relative ranking of contestants in terms of their ability to answer 
general knowledge questions. In our econometric analysis we use relative ranking of 
contestant ݆ in round ݅ denoted by ܺ1௝௜ א ሼ1, … ,10 െ ݅ሽ from subsection 3.1. 
To control for discrimination in our sample we construct two explanatory variables. 
Difference in ranks ܺ2௝௞௜ ൌ หܺ1௝௜ െ ܺ1௞௜ ห is used to investigate if different types of contestants 
(in terms of ability to answer general knowledge questions) discriminate against each other 
i.e. whether a high ability contestant ݆ votes against a low ability contestant ݇ in round i  or 
vice versa. Gender dummy ܺ3௝௞௜ א ሼ0,1ሽ is used to test for gender discrimination. Variable 
ܺ3௝௞
௜  equals one if contestants ݆ and ݇ differ in gender and equals zero otherwise. 
In The Weakest Link contestants may adopt a tit for tat strategy and vote against the 
opponent who voted against them in previous rounds. Variable ܺ4௝௞௜ א ሼ0, … , ݅ െ 1ሽ counts 
how many times contestant ݇ voted against contestant ݆ in rounds preceding round ݅ ് 1. We 
use this variable to control for contestants reciprocating the actions of their counterparts. 
Specifically, variable ܺ4௝௞௜  captures negative reciprocity. 
In order to convert correct answers to general knowledge questions into money, 
contestants have to use technology presented in Table 1. The use of this technology can result 
in two types of ex-post mistakes. First, when a contestant banks and answers her question 
correctly, she misses an opportunity to exploit non-decreasing returns to scale, embedded in 
Table 1. To control for contestants penalizing premature banking, we use explanatory variable 
ܺ5௝
௜ that shows the amount of money banked by contestant ݆ in round ݅. Second, when a 
contestant does not bank and fails to answer her question correctly, the previously 
accumulated chain of correct answers is lost. To control for contestants penalizing foregone 
banking opportunities, variable ܺ6௝௜ measures the amount of money that could have been 
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banked by contestant ݆ in round ݅, had the contestant ݆ banked before every question she 
answered incorrectly. 
Contestants stand in a semi-circle in front of the host during the show. To control for 
the effect of the distance among contestants, we use variable ܺ7௝௞௜ א ሼ1, … ,8ሽ. This variable 
measures physical distance between contestant ݆ and contestant ݇ in round ݅. Specifically, 
ܺ7௝௞
௜ ൌ 1 denotes a minimum distance between contestants i.e. when contestant ݆ stands next 
to contestant ݇ in round ݅.  ܺ7௝௞௜ ൌ 8 denotes a maximum distance between contestants i.e. 
when contestants ݆  and ݇ stand at the opposite ends of the podium. 
We estimate model (3) separately for every round ݅ א ሼ1, … ,7ሽ. Estimation was 
conducted in the Matlab 6.5 package.16 The results are presented in Table 7.  
[INSERT Table 7 HERE] 
Table 7 shows that the only variable which is highly statistically significant in all 
rounds is the rank of the opponent (ܺ1). Contestants tend to vote against the opponents who 
show a relatively low ability to answer general knowledge questions. We do not find evidence 
that contestants systematically discriminate against opponents of different ability or gender 
(Table 7). Moreover, difference in ranks (ܺ2) is statistically significant with a negative sign in 
round 6 and gender dummy (ܺ3) is statistically significant with a negative sign in rounds 1 
and 5. This means that sometimes contestants are more likely to vote against their 
counterparts with a similar ability or the same gender. 
Table 7 shows that an important determinant of individual voting decisions is negative 
reciprocity (ܺ4). In all rounds except round 6, contestants are more likely to vote against 
those who voted against them in previous rounds. In other words, contestants seem to play tit 
for tat strategies. Except for round 3, we do not find any evidence that contestants vote 
against opponents who engage in premature banking. However, in the first five rounds of the 
game there is clear evidence that contestants vote against those opponents who missed a 
banking opportunity and by answering their question incorrectly lost the team money. There 
  
 
20
is some evidence of a distance effect in the intermediate rounds of the game (3 ൑ ݅ ൑ 5). In 
these rounds contestants are more likely to vote against opponents who stand farther away 
from them on the podium. 
Interestingly, Table 7 also shows that the fit of the estimated conditional logit model 
(3) sharply deteriorates in the last rounds of the game. For example, Veall and Zimmermann 
R2 decreases from 0.3395 in round 5 to 0.1228 in round 6 and 0.0950 in round 7. In particular, 
in rounds ݅ ൌ 6,7 the minimized log-likelihood of model (3) is almost identical to the log-
likelihood ܮ଴ ൌ െܰ · lnሺ9 െ ݅ሻ of a restricted model when all coefficients ߚଵ, … , ߚ଻ are set to 
zero, i.e. when contestants make voting decisions at random. This provides additional support 
for our results in Section 3 that while contestants play pure strategies and eliminate weak 
teammates at the beginning of the game, they gradually switch to behaviorally mixed 
strategies at the end of the game. 
5. DISCUSSION 
The Weakest Link offers a unique natural laboratory to study coordination in strategic 
situations. This television show is structured as a well-defined non-cooperative game with 
high monetary incentives and a diverse subject pool. Contestants have finitely many pure 
voting strategies (they can vote against only one of their counterparts). Relative abilities of 
contestants to answer general knowledge questions are observable in all rounds of the game.  
At the beginning of the game when the decision problem is sufficiently complex the 
behavior of contestants in The Weakest Link is consistent with coordination in the presence of 
labeling. There are multiple pure strategy Nash equilibria when an overwhelming plurality of 
contestants vote against the same opponent. Contestants have an incentive to coordinate on 
some equilibrium and one equilibrium (voting off the weakest player) serves as a focal point.  
We find that contestants successfully coordinate on voting off the weakest teammate 
starting from the first round of the game, even though they do not engage in prior 
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communication and do not have an opportunity to learn. In addition, we observe that when 
making their voting decisions, contestants primarily take into account the relative rank of the 
opponent, whether this opponent has voted against them in the previous rounds, and how 
efficiently this opponent uses the technology that converts correct answers into money. 
We also find that at the end of the game when the decision problem is relatively simple, 
contestants fail to coordinate on the focal point in the majority of television episodes in our 
sample as well as tend to randomize between voting against strong and weak opponents. The 
majority of observed voting profiles at the end of the game can be explained by strictly mixed 
strategy Nash equilibrium. 
Experimental evidence on mixed strategy play in the Nash equilibrium is inconclusive. 
On the one hand, O’Neill (1987) and McCabe et al. (2000) find that subjects generally follow 
Nash mixed strategies. On the other hand, Rapoport and Boebel (1992), Mookherjee and 
Sopher (1994) find little experimental evidence of resorting to mixed strategies in the Nash 
equilibrium. However, non-experimental data from the real world are generally consistent 
with the Nash mixed-strategy equilibrium, though such investigations are quite rare 
(Chiappori et al. 2002). Walker and Wooders (2001) and Chiappori et al. (2002) find that data 
from tennis and soccer tournaments are consistent with the hypothesis that players adopt Nash 
equilibrium mixed strategies. The results of this natural experiment support these findings and 
suggest that The Weakest Link contestants are most likely to play a strictly mixed Nash 
equilibrium in the last voting round of the game. 
However, the majority of observed voting profiles can be rationalized through the 
Nash equilibrium play only when contestants, modeled as expected utility maximizers, differ 
substantially in their risk attitudes. Apparently The Weakest Link contestants systematically 
overestimate their relative chances of winning when facing the strongest opponent. This 
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overweighting of small probabilities of large outcomes is remarkably captured by cumulative 
prospect theory (or rank-dependent expected utility theory). 
The results of this paper indicate that behavior in strategic situations in a natural 
experiment, conducted on television, is generally consistent with experimental evidence that 
people use salience principles to coordinate in the absence of communication when the 
decision problem is sufficiently complex. This similarity appears to be especially striking 
given high monetary stakes, subject pool effects, observable heterogeneity, and larger number 
of players as well as other factors that distinguish natural experiments in television shows 
from the laboratory studies. 
Even though we use a television show setting to explore the effect of focal points on 
voting in strategic situations, obtained results may provide some guidance in application to 
the political arena. Particularly, our findings may be generalized to explain the differences in 
electoral behavior of voters in political systems with many and few political parties. On the 
one hand, our analysis indicates that observable party characteristics provide sufficient 
guidance for the voters in a multi-party system to produce efficient coordination in the first 
round of the voting process. Such coordination is especially apparent in representative 
democracies, where many parties compete in the elections, but only few key players gain the 
control of the government. Our results may suggest that in multi-party systems, large groups 
of voters tend to use certain identifiers of political parties as focal points, which foster 
coordination in complex decision problems. On the other hand, our analysis indicates that in 
political systems with few parties when the decision problem is relatively simple, voters do 
not rely on focal principles and approach electoral decisions in a different manner. Exploring 
the possible impact of focal points on electoral behavior is an interesting endeavor for future 
research. 
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ENDNOTES 
1 The theoretical framework of focal points has been further developed by Sugden (1995). 
2 In The Weakest Link contestants can earn up to £10,000 in every television episode. 
Therefore, contestants have considerably higher monetary incentives than in conventional 
laboratory experiments. Replicating this natural experiment in the laboratory would require 
a budget of at least £230,000. In The Weakest Link contestants vary greatly in their age, 
educational levels and occupations and come from all administrative areas of the UK, which 
makes them a more diversified sample of population compared with conventional subject 
pools of undergraduate students. 
3 For example, Levitt (2004) and Antonovics et al. (2005) examined discrimination in The 
Weakest Link using data from the American version of the show. By testing two theories of 
discrimination Levitt (2004) finds only very limited evidence of discriminative voting 
patterns against female and black contestants. However, he maintains that some contestants 
tend to discriminate against Hispanics and elderly. Levitt (2004) also argues that the 
behavior of The Weakest Link contestants is consistent with non-random voting. While 
Antonovics et al. (2005) obtain a similar result of non-discriminative voting against female 
and black contestants, they employ conditional logit analysis to show that women tend to 
discriminate against men in the early rounds of the show. Fevrier and Linnemer (2006) 
analyze a simplified strategic game similar to actual game played by three contestants when 
they vote in the last round of The Weakest Link. They identify two pure strategy Nash 
equilibria of the simplified game and argue that the voting patterns observed in the French 
version of The Weakest Link suggest that contestants coordinate on a payoff dominant 
equilibrium “if it is not too risky”. 
4 Quoted from official website of The Weakest Link television show 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/weakestlink. 
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5 If after ten questions both finalists have the same number of correct answers, the quiz 
continues until one contestant dominates the other by one correct answer. 
6 Low ability contestants have a higher probability of being eliminated and therefore, 
contestants end up in a truth-revelation equilibrium, i.e. high ability players have no 
incentive to misrepresent their type by deliberately answering general knowledge questions 
incorrectly. 
7 For pure strategy equilibria identified in proposition 1 Table 4 shows an upper bound on 
their frequency of play. Some of the voting profiles counted in Table 4 can be also the result 
of equilibrium voting when one or several contestants randomize their vote. 
8 Analysis of round 6 follows a similar logic. However, it is mathematically cumbersome and 
does not provide additional insights to the economic intuition. 
9 The first inequality in condition (2) holds when the strongest contestant is not very risk-
averse (ݎ ൑ 0.27). Otherwise, ߨଵଷ ൒ ߨଵଶ and equilibrium 2 presented in Table 5 (where the 
strongest and the weakest contestants vote against the second ranked contestant) is not 
sustainable. The last inequality in (2) holds when the weakest contestant is not extremely 
risk-seeking (ݎ ൒ െ1.35). Otherwise, equilibrium 2 presented in Table 5 does not exist. 
10 In our recorded sample there were 8 instances of voting ties in round 7 and contestant 1 was 
eliminated in 1 case, contestant 2 – in 5 cases, and contestant 3 – in 2 cases. Actual tie-
breaking rule of The Weakest Link states that the deciding vote belongs to the contestant 
who: 1) gave the smallest number of incorrect answers in the last round; 2) gave a higher 
number of correct answers in the last round; 3) banked more money for the team. 
11 This result appears to be at odds with the findings of Fevrier and Linnemer (2006) who 
identify a payoff dominant equilibrium. However, Fevrier and Linnemer (2006) consider a 
simplified strategic game similar to the voting game played by three contestants in round 7 
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of The Weakest Link. We show that equilibria of the original game played by The Weakest 
Link contestants in round 7 cannot be ranked according to the payoff dominance criterion. 
12 The results of Fisher’s exact test (Fisher 1922) remain the same even if we take into 
account 8 instances of voting ties, where contestant 1 was eliminated once, contestant 2 – 5 
times, and contestant 3 – twice. Since the weakest contestant has approximately the same 
or greater propensity of being eliminated compared with her stronger counterparts, strong 
contestants do not have any apparent reason to misinterpret their types by deliberately 
answering general knowledge questions incorrectly. 
13 To calculate a maximum number of episodes in which contestants can coordinate on 
equilibrium 4, we need to multiply the predicted frequency of voting profiles from the last 
column of Table 6 on the fraction of episodes in which contestants play equilibrium 4 and 
search for the highest possible fraction such that for every voting profile the predicted 
frequency of occurrence does not exceed an actually observed frequency. 
14 The behavior of contestant 2 in round 7 can also be explained by assuming that contestant 2 
is irrational. For example, since The Weakest Link is broadcasted on national television, 
contestant 2 might be concerned about her reputation and, therefore, might be less prone to 
vote against her strongest opponent. 
15 Conditional logit has also been employed in the analysis of discrimination in The Weakest 
Link television show by Antonovics et al. (2005). 
16 Program files and data are available from authors on request. 
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TABLES 
Table 1 Technology that converts correct answers into money 
Number of correct 
answers given in a 
row up to this point 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 ≥9 
Amount of money 
that may be banked £0 £20 £50 £100 £200 £300 £450 £600 £800 £1000 
 
Table 2 Selected descriptive statistics  
Descriptive Statistics Value 
Percent of female 41.11  
Percent of male 58.89 
Minimum age (years) 18 
Maximum age (years) 84 
Average age (years) 46 
Average earnings (£) 2,330.60 
Median earnings (£) 2,275.00 
Standard deviation (£) 846.70 
 
Table 3 Relative difficulty of questions across rounds 
Round r 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Weight ߱௥ 0.0873 0.1920 0.2716 0.2904 0.3213 0.3339 0.4003 
 
Table 4 Outcomes of the overwhelming plurality voting in rounds 1-5 
Round Total episodes 
Episodes when the plurality votes against the contestant ranked… 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 73 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 2 66 
2 50 0 0 0 0 2 2 6 40  
3 42 0 0 0 1 1 8 32  
4 45 1 2 2 5 6 29  
5 19 0 2 1 4 12  
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Table 5 Four possible Nash equilibria in round 7 
Equi-
libria Action of contestant 1 Action of contestant 2 Action of contestant 3 
1 Any (pure or mixed) ܵଶଵ ܵଷଵ 
2 ଵܵଶ 
ܵଶଵ with probability 
݌߳ ቈ0,
2ߨଷ
ଶ െ ߨଷ
ଵ
2ߨଷ
ଵ െ ߨଷ
ଶ቉ 
ܵଷଶ 
3 ଵܵଷ ܵଶଷ 
ܵଷଵ with probability 
ݎ߳ ቂ
ଷ൫గభ
మିగభ
య൯
ଶగభ
మିగభ
య ,
ଶగమ
యିగమ
భ
ଶగమ
భିగమ
యቃ  
4 
ଵܵ
ଶ with probability ݍ෤ ൌ 
2ߨଷଵ െ ߨଷଶ
2ߨଷ
ଶ െ ߨଷ
ଵ ൭1 െ
2ߨଵଶ െ ߨଵଷ
2ߨଵ
ଷ െ ߨଵ
ଶ ൬1 െ
2ߨଶଷ െ ߨଶଵ
2ߨଶ
ଵ െ ߨଶ
ଷ൰൱
1 ൅
2ߨଵ
ଶ െ ߨଵ
ଷ2ߨଶ
ଷ െ ߨଶ
ଵ2ߨଷ
ଵ െ ߨଷ
ଶ
2ߨଵ
ଷ െ ߨଵ
ଶ2ߨଶ
ଵ െ ߨଶ
ଷ2ߨଷ
ଶ െ ߨଷ
ଵ
ܵଶଷwith probability ݌෤ ൌ 
2ߨଵଶ െ ߨଵ
ଷ
2ߨଵ
ଷ െ ߨଵ
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Table 6 Theoretically possible voting profiles in round 7: observed frequency in the data 
and a predicted frequency of occurrence in equilibria 1-4 
Voting 
profile* 
Observed 
frequency 
Predicted frequency in equilibria… 
1 2 3 4 
211 12% ߠଵ א ሾ0, 1ሿ 0 0 ݍ෤ሺ1 െ ݌෤ሻ̃ݎ 
311 11% 1 െ ߠଵ 0 0 ሺ1 െ ݍ෤ሻሺ1 െ ݌෤ሻ̃ݎ 
212 11% 0 ߠଶ א ቈ0,
2ߨଷଶ െ ߨଷଵ
2ߨଷ
ଵ െ ߨଷ
ଶ቉ 0 ݍ෤ሺ1 െ ݌෤ሻሺ1 െ ̃ݎሻ 
232 21% 0 1 െ ߠଶ 0 ݍ෤݌෤ሺ1 െ ̃ݎሻ 
331 15% 0 0 ߠଷ א ቈ3
ߨଵଶ െ ߨଵଷ
2ߨଵ
ଶ െ ߨଵ
ଷ ,
2ߨଶଷ െ ߨଶଵ
2ߨଶ
ଵ െ ߨଶ
ଷ቉ ሺ1 െ ݍ෤ሻ݌෤̃ݎ 
332 22% 0 0 1 െ ߠଷ ሺ1 െ ݍ෤ሻ݌෤ሺ1 െ ̃ݎሻ 
231 4% 0 0 0 ݍ෤݌෤̃ݎ 
312 4% 0 0 0 ሺ1 െ ݍ෤ሻሺ1 െ ݌෤ሻሺ1 െ ̃ݎሻ 
* The first number denotes the rank of contestant against whom contestant 1 casts her vote, 
and the last number denotes the rank of contestant against whom contestant 3 casts her vote 
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Table 7 Estimated conditional logit model of individual voting decisions 
Variable Round 1 
coefficient 
(standard 
error) 
Round 2 
coefficient 
(standard 
error)
Round 3 
coefficient 
(standard 
error)
Round 4 
coefficient 
(standard 
error)
Round 5 
coefficient 
(standard 
error)
Round 6 
coefficient 
(standard 
error) 
Round 7 
coefficient 
(standard 
error)
Rank (ܺ1) 0.6634
*** 0.5755*** 0.5453*** 0.5024*** 0.4485*** 0.3325*** 0.2028*
(0.0326) (0.0269) (0.0290) (0.0320) (0.0411) (0.0527) (0.0931) 
Difference 
in ranks (ܺ2) 
0.0444 0.0497 0.0491 0.1201** -0.0674 -0.1896* -0.1493 
(0.0338) (0.0306) (0.0370) (0.0427) (0.056) (0.0789) (0.1490) 
Gender (ܺ3) -0.2141
* 0.0033 0.1982* -0.0636 -0.2658* -0.1540 -0.0100 
(0.0839) (0.0876) (0.0946) (0.0999) (0.1094) (0.1261) (0.1816) 
Negative re-
ciprocity (ܺ4) 
- 0.4637*** 0.4009** 0.8312*** 0.4541*** 0.1633 0.6437***
 (0.0496) (0.1534) (0.1303) (0.1271) (0.1256) (0.1668) 
Money banked 
(ܺ5) 
0.0358 -0.0544 0.1341* 0.0571 -0.0895 -0.0619 -0.0965 
(0.0188) (0.0390) (0.0599) (0.0599) (0.0742) (0.0764) (0.1139) 
Money lost 
(ܺ6) 
0.3664*** 0.4088*** 0.8203*** 0.3612** 0.5972*** 0.0642 0.3556 
(0.0441) (0.0684) (0.1014) (0.1120) (0.1613) (0.1433) (0.3311) 
Distance (ܺ7) 0.0177 0.0237 0.0647
** 0.0700** 0.0894** 0.0557 0.0271 
(0.0224) (0.0229) (0.0241) (0.0262) (0.0296) (0.0343) (0.0472) 
Observations 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 
Log-likelihood -1142.7 -1022.3 -865.9 -749.3 -576.5 -410.4 -194.0 
MacFadden 
pseudo R2 0.3894 0.3433 0.3096 0.2241 0.1683 0.0661 0.0670 
Veall and 
Zimmermann R2 0.7669 0.6998 0.6294 0.476 0.3395 0.1228 0.0950 
* Significant at 0.05 significance level 
** Significant at 0.01 significance level 
*** Significant at 0.001 significance level 
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FIGURES 
Round 1 … Round 7 Final 
A team of 9 
contestants 
can earn 
money by 
answering 
general 
knowledge 
questions 
9 members of 
the team 
eliminate one 
contestant by 
independent 
plurality 
voting  
… 
A team of 3 
contestants 
can earn 
money by 
answering 
general 
knowledge 
questions 
3 members 
of the team 
eliminate 
one 
contestant 
by 
independent 
plurality 
voting 
2 contestants 
can earn 
money by 
answering 
general 
knowledge 
questions 
The winner 
is 
determined 
in a general 
knowledge 
quiz  
 
t=1 
 
t=2 
 
… t=13 t=14 t=15 
time 
t=16 
Figure 1 Timing of the game 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Cumulative distribution function of the payoff for contestant who is ranked 1 
(left panel) and a certainty equivalent payoff for CRRA utility function (right panel) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Cumulative distribution function of the payoff for contestant who is ranked 2 
(left panel) and a certainty equivalent payoff for CRRA utility function (right panel)
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Figure 4 Cumulative distribution function of the payoff for contestant who is ranked 3 
(left panel) and a certainty equivalent payoff for CRRA utility function (right panel) 
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Figure 5 Normal form game representation of voting in round 7 
 
